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NOTE 

CONFIDENCE IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR THROUGH 
SARBANES-0XLEY-STYLE REFORMS 
Joseph Mead* 
Over the past several years, the nonprofit sector suffered a series of 
highly visible scandals that shook the public's confidence in chari­
table organizations. Concerned politicians and nonprofit leaders 
responded with a variety of reforms inspired by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The Note focuses on three such reforms: requiring nonprofit of­
ficers certify financial statements, mandating audits of nonprofits' 
financial statements, and imposing independent audit committees 
on nonprofit boards ofdirectors. This Note argues that, contrary to 
the conclusions ofmany commentators, these reforms will provide a 
net benefit to the nonprofit sector by increasing donor confidence 
while imposing minimal costs. 
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IfAmericans cannot trust their charities, they will stop giving and those in 
need will suffer.' 
INTRODUCTION 
There are over one million nonprofits in the United States,2 and these or­
ganizations play a tremendous role in American society. Charities improve 
the lives of disadvantaged individuals. Religious organizations give people a 
sense of meaning. Voluntary associations provide opportunities for camara­
derie. 
Commensurate with the importance of nonprofit organizations, American 
participation in philanthropy is overwhelming. In recent years, nonprofit or­
ganizations reported over $1.5 trillion in revenue to the Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS").3 Nearly ninety percent of American households donate 
money to charity, contributing an average of $1,620 per year.4 And in 2000, 
over eighty-million adults volunteered their time, donating over an esti­
mated $200 billion in free services.5 
1. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities: 
Hearing of the S. Comm. on Fin., I08th Cong. 7 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (statement of 
Mark Everson, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Service). 
2. According to the Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics ("NCCS"), in 
2006 there were 1,478,194 nonprofits registered with the Internal Revenue Service within the past 
two years. NCCS-Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States 1996-2006, http:// 
nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile 1.php?state=us (last visited Nov. IO, 2007). Of these, ap­
proximately two-thirds (1,014, 165) were religious, educational, charitable, scientific, or literary 
organizations governed by § 501 ( c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See id. 
3. See id. (follow "50l(c)(3) Public Charities" hyperlink); id. (follow "50l(c)(3) Private 
Foundations" hyperlink); id. (follow "Other 50l(c) Nonprofit Organizations" hyperlink). 
4. INDEP. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2001), available 
at http://www.independentsector.org/pdfs/gvOI keyfind.pdf. These data are for the year 2000. 
5. 	 Id. at 2. 
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Recently, however, the public has begun to perceive nonprofit organiza­
tions as being ineptly or corruptly managed.6 Following the lead of federal 
legislation addressing corporate-mismanagement scandals,7 many proposed 
similar state and federal legislation and voluntary standards for the nonprofit 
sector. Legal commentators are universally critical of these reforms.8 This 
Note answers many of these criticisms by providing new empirical argu­
ments in support of the legislation.9 It reviews and analyzes the reform 
proposals and concludes that these proposals will improve the nonprofit sec­
tor. Part I explains the scandals that undermined public perception of 
nonprofits and the reforms proposed to restore public confidence. Part II 
argues that the reforms would impose only modest costs on nonprofits. Fi­
nally, Part III contends that the reforms would ultimately improve donor 
confidence. 
I. THE "CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE" 10 AND THE RESULTING REFORMS 
Widely publicized scandals over the past several years have led to di­
minished public confidence in nonprofit organizations. Section I.A describes 
how scandals involving national organizations such as the Red Cross, the 
United Way, and the Nature Conservancy shook public perception of non­
profits. Section J.B. discusses how various legislatures and nonprofit leaders 
proposed reforming financial practices to reassure donors and restore faith 
in the nonprofit sector. Borrowing heavily from Sarbanes-Oxley, these re­
forms included mandatory management-officer certification of financial 
statements, the creation of audit committees, and general auditing require­
ments by independent auditors. 
6. See infra Section I.A. 
7. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523-24 (2005). 
8. Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector: Can 
Increased Disclosure of Information be Utilized Effectively?, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 447 (2006); 
Robert W. Friz & Elizabeth Virgin, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act-Considerations for Nonprofit Health 
Care Organizations, HEALTH L., June 2006, at l; Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose 
ls Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 
(2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive 
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004) [hereinafter Reiser, Enron.org]; Dana 
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals 
for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 559 (2005) [hereinafter Reiser, There Ought]; Wendy 
K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (And Bad) Governance: Applying The Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303; Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in 
the Nonprofit World: Should States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corpora­
tions?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831 (2007); Jane Heath, Comment, Who's Minding the Nonprofit Store: 
Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have Anything to Offer Nonprofits?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 781 (2004). 
9. This Note, as well as the other commentary, raises many empirical questions that can 
only be resolved with data. Hopefully future research in this field will develop more concrete data 
that will lead to more informed policymaking. 
10. 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S. 
Fin. Comm.). 
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A. The Scandals 
In the years leading up to the proposed reforms, scandals affecting 
highly visible nonprofits captured the public's interest. One of the most pub­
licized scandals involved the handling of donations by the Red Cross 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although many do­
nors intended to help the victims of the terrorist attacks, the Red Cross 
funneled their donations to other operations.'' After media-fueled outrage 
over the scandal, the Red Cross apologized and changed the way it used 
those funds. 12 According to one survey, a higher percentage of Americans 
paid attention to this scandal than the Enron bankruptcy. 13 
Like the Red Cross, the United Way recently endured widely publicized 
scandals. The United Way of the National Capital Area (which covers the 
Washington D.C. area) fell victim to financial mismanagement 14 when the 
CEO of the organization took $1.5 million in "questionable payments," in­
cluding advances on salary and undocumented reimbursements, from 1987 
to 2001. 15 Some board members knew of the suspicious behavior but failed 
to alert the entire board or otherwise correct the situation. 16 When the scan­
dal broke in 2002, donations to the local charity dropped sixty percent, from 
$45 million to $18 million. 11 Contemporary high-profile scandals at other 
United Way chapters, such as the 2002 discovery of the embezzlement of $2 
million from the chapter based in Lansing, Michigan, 18 led many to question 
United Way chapters around the country. 19 
Other nonprofit financial scandals bombarded the public during this 
time. For example, Congress began investigating the "world's largest envi­
ronmental organization," the Nature Conservancy, for improper land deals 
that benefited "insiders."20 In California, legislators were concerned when 
Aaron Tonken, a Hollywood fundraiser, pleaded guilty to diverting $7 mil­
11. Mark O' Keefe, For charities, bad year beginning to hit home, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002. 
12. Paul C. Light, Opinion, The Red Cross is No Enron, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 6, 
2002, at 9. 
13. Id. ("According to a Brookings Institution survey conducted in December 2001, 60 per­
cent of Americans said they were following the Red Cross story very or fairly closely, placing it 
ahead of the death of former Beatie George Harrison and the Enron bankruptcy."). 
14. See generally David C. Johnston, United Way Official Knew About Abuses, Memo Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, atA12. 
15. Peter Whoriskey & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Charity Concealed Pilfering: Auditors Had 
Flagged United Way Ex-Chief, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2003, at 7. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Chris Andrews, United Way Recovers Most of its Stolen $2M, LANSING ST. J., July 8, 
2005, at IB. 
19. For example, a participant in the 2004 federal hearing relayed an anecdote where she 
told her doctor she was testifying about "charity abuses" and her doctor immediately brought up 
United Way. 2004 Hearing, supra note I, at 40 (statement of Ms. MacNab). 
20. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Senators Question Conservancy's Practices; End to 
'Insider' and 'Side' Deals by Nonprofit Organizations ls Urged, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2005, at A3. 
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21lion of charitable donations to himself and his "associates." News articles 
from 1995 to 2002 reported a total loss of $1.28 billion due to nonprofit 22
scandals during that period. Simultaneously, financial scandals in the cor­
porate world, such as Enron, exacerbated the public's worries.23 
Public trust in nonprofit organizations waned as a result of these scan­
dals. One survey found that confidence in nonprofits dropped from 90% to2460% between 2001 and 2002. Most of this distrust stemmed from how 
nonprofits handled money. In 2006, 71 % of those surveyed said that non­
25profits waste a great deal or a fair amount of money. While 30% of the 
survey participants thought that charities did a very good job helping people, 
only 11 % thought they did a good job spending money wisely.26 This dis­
trust manifested itself in part in the increasing number of individuals 
choosing to create private foundations rather than trust preexisting organiza­
tions.27 
28Influenced by media coverage of the "bad apples," many donors con­
29
cluded that the entire nonprofit sector was corrupt. When nonprofits with a 
strong national name such as the Red Cross are tainted, the effects of the 
scandal reverberate. Indeed, the two strongest predictors of an individual's 
confidence in the nonprofit sector are that individual's confidence in the Red 
21. See Leora Gershenzon, Bill Analysis, SB 1262, at 5-6 (Cal. 2004), available at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_l 251- l 300/sb_ l 262_cfa_20040621_ 122508_asm_ 
comm.html (last visited Nov. IO, 2007). See also Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of 
Cal., Attorney General Lockyer Unveils Reforms to Toughen Nonprofit Accountability, Fund­
raiser Controls (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/release.php?id= 
584&year=2004& month=2 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). At the same time in California, the col­
lection agency for the Los Angeles United Way, Pipe Vine, could not account for all the donations 
it received. See generally Heath, supra note 8, at 787-90. 
22. Brad Wolverton, Charity Fraud Exceeds $/ Billion, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 
2003, at 26; Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of 
Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper 
No. 20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=45 l 240. 
23. See Carol Graham et al., Cooking the Books: The Cost to the Economy, PoL'Y BRIEF 
(Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2002, at I, available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/ 
policybriefs/pbl 06.pdf (estimating that corporate scandals, including Enron and WorldCom, cost the 
United States economy $35 billion in 2002 due to investor panic); Paul C. Light, Confidence in 
Charitable Organizations, RES. BRIEF (Organizational Performance Initiative, New York, N.Y.), 
Aug. 2006, at 2, available at http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/confidence/charities06.pdf (attrib­
uting the decline in confidence to for-profit scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and Martha 
Stewart). 
24. PAUL C. LIGHT, N.Y. UNIV. & BROOKINGS INST., FACT SHEET ON THE CONTINUED CRI­
SIS IN CHARITABLE CONFIDENCE I (2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/ 
light/20040913.pdf. 
25. Light, supra note 23, at 2. 
26. Id. 
27. 2004 Hearing, supra note I, at 40 (testimony of Mr. Adkisson). 
28. Id. (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S. Fin. Comm.) ("Are the good 
guys getting a bad name? Do you find that confidence in charitable giving is starting to decline 
because it is known that there are a lot of bad apples?"). 
29. A similar phenomenon was observed in the public reaction to corporate scandals. See 
Graham et al., supra note 23, at 2 ("Part of the problem stems from the public perception that the 
[Enron] scandal is situated at the center rather than the periphery of the system."). 
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Cross and United Way.30 Whether justified or not, this perception led to calls 
for nonprofit-sector reform. 
B. The Reforms 
Over the past four years, state attorneys general and nonprofit-sector 
leaders have suggested nonprofit reforms. At the federal level, the Senate 
Committee on Finance produced both a "staff discussion draft" paper to 
assist the committee in formulating "possible legislation"31 and a bill that 
died in committee. 32 Meanwhile, several states considered33 or adopted34 
their own reforms. The nonprofit community simultaneously suggested vol­
untary reforms, in part to stave off more stringent, mandatory regulation.35 
The nonprofit-reform proposals focused primarily on improving disclo­
sure by incorporating Sarbanes-Oxley-style provisions. 36 Section I.B.1 
describes efforts to improve the accuracy of annual reports. These proposals 
would make the nonprofit CEO responsible for the accuracy of such reports. 
Section l.B.2 discusses new proposed requirements that would increase the 
thoroughness of annual-report audits. Section l.B.3 details the mandates 
requiring structural or governance changes to the board of directors. 
1. Proposed Certification Requirements Mirror Sarbanes-Oxley 
Several nonprofit reforms mimic Sarbanes-Oxley's officer-certification 
requirements. SOX mandates that a corporate CEO and CFO certify that the 
periodic financial reports "fairly present in all material respects the financial 
condition" of the company.37 The officer must also certify that effective in­
ternal controls are in place.38 Similarly, several nonprofit reforms would 
require an organization principal to certify reports. The Senate Finance 
Committee Staff proposal closely mirrors Sarbanes-Oxley's certification 
provision. It requires that the CEO certify that the nonprofit has "processes 
30. Light, supra note 23, at 6. 
31. Staff Discussion Draft, Senate Fin. Comm. 1 (2004), available at http:// 
finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf. 
32. CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. (2003). 
33. Such reforms were considered in Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1983 nn.9-11. 
34. Such reforms were adopted in California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and West 
Virginia. Id. at 1983 n.12. 
35. See BoARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/ 
sarbanesoxley.pdf. 
36. Sarbanes-Oxley does not, by its terms, apply to nonprofit organizations--except in two 
relatively minor ways. First, all organizations, including nonprofits, are prohibited from retaliating 
against whistleblowers. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 845 n.100. Second, nonprofits are required to 
retain documents if needed in a federal investigation. Id. at 845 n.101 
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. III 2003). 
38. Id. 
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and procedures" that ensure accurate reporting and that the CEO "[be] pro­
vided reasonable assurance of the accuracy and completeness of all material 39
aspects of the return." Similarly, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, a coali­40tion spearheaded by the Independent Sector at the behest of the Senate 
Finance Committee, recommended that the IRS require either the CEO or41CFO of a nonprofit to sign Form 990 statements under penalty of perjury42to attest that they are "true, correct, and complete." The Panel stopped 
short of suggesting 'I: required statement on the sufficiency of internal con­
trols.43 In its voluntary standards, the Independent Sector encourages CEOs 
and CFOs to "fully understand such reports and make sure they are accurate 
and complete" but stops short of recommending that they certify them.44 
State attorneys general have also proposed legislation requiring officer 
certification. Like the federal government, however, states have been hesi­
tant to adopt this requirement. In 2003, Eliot Spitzer, then attorney general 
of New York, proposed legislation that adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley officer­45
certification requirements wholesale for large nonprofits. The legislation 
also would have required a statement regarding the sufficiency of internal 
controls of large nonprofits, while requiring less of officers of smaller non­
profits.46 However, when the legislature did not share his enthusiasm, Spitzer 47
removed this provision from his revised proposal. Instead, the legislation 
clarifies that a failure to file a "complete and accurate" report would be a 48
violation of the officer's fiduciary duty. Likewise, the attorney general of 
Massachusetts originally proposed a requirement that both the CEO and the 
chair of the board of directors of nonprofits with revenue over $100,000 
39. Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 31, at 8. 
40. The Independent Sector is an umbrella organization of over 500 nonprofits with a 
mission to "lead[], strengthen[], and mobilize[] the charitable community in order to fulfill our 
vision of a just and inclusive society and a healthy democracy of active citizens, effective institu­
tions, and vibrant communities." Independent Sector, About Us, http://www.independentsector.org/ 
about/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
41. Form 990 is a statement of certain financial information that nonprofits must file with the 
IRS. 
42. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, )NDEP. SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, 
GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 26, 29 (June 2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/ 
Panel_Final_Report.pdf [hereinafter PANEL REPORT]. 
43. Id. 
44. BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 7. 
45. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 570; Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1304. 
46. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 570; Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1304. 
47. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 571; see also LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING 
COMM'N, No. 07612-02-5, AN ACT TO AMEND THE NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW AND RE­
LIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW, IN RELATION TO PROTECTIONS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD AND 
ABUSE (2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char_pdf/ag68-05.pdf (drafted at the 
request of the Attorney General). 
48. Assemb. B. 7825, 228th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (referred to Senate Committee 
on Rules on June 19, 2006). 
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certify the accuracy of financial statements.49 However, the state legislature 
rejected this proposed legislation.so 
2. Proposed Audit-Committee Oversight ofAuditing Work also 
Mirrors Sarbanes-Oxley Requirements 
Like Sarbanes-Oxley, proposed nonprofit reforms also address the impor­
tance of having a thorough, independent audit. Sarbanes-Oxley dictates 
independence requirements for the audit committees of public companies.s1 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee "plays a critical role in providing 
oversight over and serving as a check and balance on a company's financial 
reporting system."s2 The committee is charged with the "appointment, com­
pensation, and oversight" of the company's auditor.s3 Each member of the 
audit committee must be an independent director.s4 Additionally, each audit 
committee must have at least one member who is a financial expert or provide 
reasons why there is not such an expert.ss Finally, an audit committee should 
establish a mechanism for anonymous reporting of "questionable accounting 
or auditing matters."s6 When no separate audit committee is formed, the entire 
board is charged with the duties of an audit committee, subject to the stringent 
audit-committee requirements.s7 
Many nonprofit-reform proposals impose Sarbanes-Oxley-style audit­
committee requirements on large nonprofits. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, audit­
committee responsibilities under the reforms include decisions regarding hir­
ing, firing, and supervising the auditor and otherwise "satisfy[ing] it[self] ... 
that the financial affairs of the corporation are in order."ss Reforms also im­
49. An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, H.B. 4347, 184th Gen. 
Court (Mass. 2005). 
50. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 564. 
51. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I (Supp. III 2003); SEC Listing 
Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOA-3 (2005); SEC Standards Relating to 
Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249, 274). 
52. SEC Standards Relating to Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
18,789. 
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301. 
54. Id. Independence means not being "affiliated" with the company other than as a director 
or receiving compensation from the company other than for service on the board. Id. 
55. Id. § 407. 
56. Id. § 301. 
57. SEC Standards Relating to Listed Company Auditing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
18,790 ("If the entire board constitutes the audit committee, the new SRO rules adopted under 
Exchange Act Rule lOA-3, including the independence requirements, will apply to the issuer's 
board as a whole."). 
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586(e)(2) (West 2005). 
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pose independence requirements on audit-committee members identical to 
those of Sarbanes-Oxley.59 
Despite these similarities, there are a few notable differences between the 
nonprofit audit committees and those required by Sarbanes-Oxley. First, no 
nonprofit reform requires that a financial expert be placed on the audit com­
mittee, 60 though one reform suggests "includ[ing] individuals with some 
financial literacy ... as a matter of recommended practice."61 Second, the New 
York law, for example, would have allowed a nonprofit to opt out of the audit­
committee requirements by amending its bylaws-the reforms do not require 
an audit committee if the certificate of incorporation or bylaws prohibit the 
creation of such a committee.62 Third, the reforms depart from Sarbanes­
Oxley by not requiring that members of the audit committee be members of 
the board, provided that at least half of the audit committee is composed of 
board members.63 Finally, as Table 1 illustrates, all audit-committee reforms 
are only mandatory for large nonprofits. 
TABLE I 
Reform Threshold to Implicate Audit 
Committee Requirements 
(Annual Revenue) 
Independent Sector voluntary standard All organizations that conduct outside audits" 
California Nonprofit Integrity Act $2 million65 
Massachusetts bill $500,00066 
New York bill $2 million67 
Despite important differences, both Sarbanes-Oxley and the nonprofit re­
forms require an independent audit committee to ensure that the auditor is not 
59. See id. § 12586(e)(2) ("The audit committee may include persons who are not members 
of the board of directors, but the member or members of the audit committee shall not include any 
members of the staff, including the president or chief executive officer and the treasurer or chief 
financial officer."). 
60. Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 261 & n.213. 
61. PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 79. 
62. S.B. 4836-B, § 4, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2004) (proposing N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 7 l 2(g)). 
63. E.g., Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, S.B. 1262, § 7, 2003--04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2004) (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586); An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public 
Charities, H.B. 4347, § 4(a), 184th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005). 
64. BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 4. 
65. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12586. 
66. Mass. H.B. 4347, § 3(g); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §SF (2002). 
67. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, § 4 (proposing N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 712(g)(I)). An earlier version of the 
New York bill would have set the standard at $1 million in revenue or $3 million in assets. Mulligan, 
supra note 8, at 1992-93 (citing N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, § 4). 
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beholden to staff and effectively scrutinizes the financial condition of the or­
• • 68garuzat1on. 
3. Proposed Requirements Reflect Sarbanes-Oxley's Emphasis 
on the Importance ofAuditing 
The proposed nonprofit reforms reflect the importance of auditing by call­
ing for regular audits by independent auditors.69 Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
impose an auditing requirement on for-profit corporations because these cor­
porations were required to prepare audited statements before Sarbanes­
Oxley.70 However, many of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms were motivated by the 
importance of thorough, accurate audits by impartial auditors in avoiding fi­
nancial mismanagement.71 Auditing requirements strive to improve nonprofit 
governance by applying Sarbanes-Oxley-style concerns to nonprofit organiza­
tions, in particular large organizations. For example, California law imposes 
auditing requirements and requires that the auditor maintain its independence 
as defined by the Comptroller General's Government Auditing Standards and 
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.72 Many nonprofit reforms 
are based on a two-tiered auditing requirement; depending on the size of the 
organization, requirements differ. 
TABLE 2 
Reform Threshold to File 
a Report from an 
Independent Accountant 
Threshold for a Full 
Audit of Financial 
Statements 
Nonprofit Panel proposed reform73 $250,000 $1 million 
Committee Staff proposed reform" $100,000 $250,000 
Independent Sector voluntary standard" $250,000 $1 million 
California Nonprofit Integrity Act'0 - $2 million 
68. See Cal. S.B. 1262, § 6. 
69. Massachusetts had this idea long before Sarbanes-Oxley, imposing a two-tiered auditing 
requirement on nonprofit organizations since the late 1970s. Ch. 12, § SF. Organizations with annual 
revenue over $500,000 must undergo a full audit, while organizations with annual revenue between 
$100,000 and $500,000 must obtain an "independent certified public accountant's review report." Id. 
70. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 573 (citing SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 210.3-01to210.3-20 (2004)). 
71. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (Supp. III 2003) (legislat­
ing auditor independence). 
72. Cal. S.B. 1262, § 7(e)(l); see also PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 80. 
73. PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 5. 
74. Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 31, at 9. 
75. BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 35, at 3-4. 
76. Cal. S.B. 1262, § 6. 
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Table 2 illustrates the centrality of the auditing requirements to the re­
form proposals: organizations with revenue as low as $100,000 would have 
to file a report on their financial statements prepared by an independent ac­
countant, while full audits would be required of organizations with revenue 
as low as $250,000. 
II. THE REFORMS ARE NOT EXCESSIVELY COSTLY 
This Part responds to common criticisms of proposals calling for the 
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms in the nonprofit sector. Section II.A 
argues that Sarbanes-Oxley-modeled reforms generally may be justified in the 
nonprofit sector because, perhaps unlike the corporate sector, the benefits of 
such reforms may outweigh the costs. Section 11.B details how the potential 
costs of each of the reforms actually proposed--officer-certification, audit­
committee, and auditing requirements-are insignificant compared with po­
tential benefits. This Part concludes that neither Sarbanes-Oxley-style 
reforms generally nor nonprofit-reform proposals specifically are likely to 
impose excessive costs. 
A. In General, the Benefits ofSarbanes-Oxley-Inspired 

Reforms Outweigh the Costs in the Nonprofit Sector 

Critics of the reforms lament the financial costs that the reforms will im­
pose, but such concerns are misguided.77 Pointing to the expense of Sarbanes­
Oxley, critics argue that the financial costs to a resource-scarce sector will be 
crippling, diverting funds away from the nonprofit's mission and potentially 
reducing its provision of services.78 As evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley-style 
reforms are too expensive for the nonprofit sector, one commentator notes that 
Sarbanes-Oxley caused many smaller corporations to go private to avoid the 
costs of compliance79 and argues that "[i]f small for-profit companies find 
the Act's burdens to be prohibitively expensive, it can be predicted that 
many smaller nonprofits would reach the same conclusion."80 
77. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, has been strongly criticized as being far too expensive, 
perhaps even causing some smaller corporations to withdraw from public stock markets. Szymanski, 
supra note 8, at 1318. One study places the net private cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley at 
$1.4 trillion. Special Report: A Price Worth Paying?: Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley, EcoNOMIST, May 
21, 2005, at 82. Others suggest that large firms spend an average of 70,000 additional man-hours to 
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements. Id. 
78. John Boudreau, Bill Expands Accountability for Charities, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, 
Sept. 2, 2004, at 3C (noting criticism of California's bill by nonprofits); Signing Statement, Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger (Oct. I, 2004) (on file with author) ("[W)hile I support transparency, account­
ability and curbing unscrupulous activities, I encourage the Legislature to ensure the non-profit 
community is not subjected to needless bureaucracy thereby potentially hampering the work and 
contributions made by non-profits who are serving California communities in need."). 
79. See generally Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private 
Decisions, 4 J. AccT. & ECON. 116 (2007) (discussing the benefits of going private). 
80. Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1318. Another commentator has noted that for-profit corpo­
rations ha~e the option of going private to avoid regulation, an option not available to nonprofits. 
Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 849-50. 
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In contrast to the corporate sector, the benefits of such proposals may 
outweigh the costs in the nonprofit sector, and many nonprofits are voluntar­81ily assuming additional obligations. For-profit corporations' responses to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, with the singular goal of improving their financial condi­
tion, do not necessarily imply that similar nonprofit reforms are 
prohibitively expensive. The nonprofit sector does not share the same mar­
ket-driven, self-executing accountability mechanisms as the for-profit sector. 
Nonprofits lack three accountability reinforcements, thus rendering the 
usual market forces inadequate: stakeholder self-interest (and therefore in­
centives to monitor); intense, efficiency-forcing competition; and a common 82
metric of success (profit). Because existing accountability measures have 
failed to deter violations or bolster their image, nonprofits have found addi­
tional accountability measures necessary in order to meet the demands of 
their donors and stakeholders alike. Recognizing that they are more vulner­
able to mismanagement than the corporate world and that they are 
accountable to a greater number of stakeholders,83 nonprofits are voluntarily 
incorporating Sarbanes-Oxley principles at a rate higher than for-profit or­
ganizations not directly covered by the law.84 
Not only does voluntary compliance suggests that the cost-benefit analy­
sis in the nonprofit sector is different than in the corporate sector, but 
nonprofits' access to lower-cost labor evidences the extent to which the cost 
of reform proposals may be limited. Nonprofits have access to a key re­
source that for-profit corporations do not: pro bono professionals.85 While 
nonprofits may not have a preexisting infrastructure for regulatory compli­
ance,86 they may have access to free or reduced-price professional assistance 
to improve their organizational accountability. With the ability to harness the 
work product of charitably minded professionals, nonprofits can undertake 
81. Unfortunately, providing a net benefit to the sector does not necessarily mean that each 
individual nonprofit will benefit. It is possible that some will have to bear costs that exceed their 
own benefit. This imbalance may cause some nonprofits to reduce services or shut down completely. 
For example, nonprofits that do not generally receive donations will not benefit from a boost in 
donor confidence. Whether some nonprofits are more severely impacted than others is a concern, 
and legislatures should monitor such effects. 
82. J. GREGORY DEES ET AL., ENTERPRISING NONPROFITS: A Toot.KIT FOR SOCIAL ENTRE­
PRENEURS 105 (2001). 
83. Stakeholders include donors, beneficiaries, and the general public. The conventional 
wisdom is that corporations are accountable primarily to shareholders only. 
84. PAUL D. BROUDE, THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-0Xt.EY ON PRIVATE & NONPROFIT COM­
PANIES IO (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUploadl 37/3511/ 
ndi%202006%20private%20study.pdf (attributing nonprofits' willingness to incorporate Sarbanes­
Oxley principles to the fact that they have a "greater number of stakeholders to whom they are ac­
countable"). The study found, for example, that ninety percent of nonprofits surveyed implemented 
or planned to implement independent-director requirements and ninety-seven percent of nonprofits 
utilize audit-committee oversight of auditors. Id. 
85. See. e.g., Ariz. Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, ASCPA: Find a CPA: Request a CPA 
for Pro Bono Nonprofit Work, http://www.ascpa.com/public/findacpa/request_for_pro_bono.aspx 
(last visited Nov. IO, 2007) (offering to connect nonprofits with volunteer CPAs). 
86. See Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 848-49; see also id. at 835-43 (discussing the limited 
prereform nonprofit-accountability mechanisms). · 
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some tasks at much lower cost than their for-profit counterparts. This further 
compels the conclusion that Sarbanes-Oxley accountability measures are 
more appropriate in the nonprofit sector than for some businesses.87 
B. The Benefits of the Specific Nonprofit-Reform Proposals 

Similarly Outweigh the Costs 

Critics overstate the potential costs as compared to the benefits of the 
proposed reforms detailed in Section LB. They point out that certification 
provisions require officers to spend more time verifying their financial in­
formation and less time on their other duties. 88 Some argue that such 
constraints on an officer's time may necessitate additional staff.89 Alterna­
tively, the officer may be required to work longer hours and may demand 
additional compensation for this additional work. The nonprofit may have to 
choose between paying the officer more for his or her increased workload 
and paying an additional employee to perform the job functions the officer 
is no longer able to perform. 
However, it is not clear that the additional time commitment will create 
a dearth of individuals willing to accept positions as officers in nonprofit 
organizations. In fact, many nonprofits have voluntarily adopted officer­
certification requirements for their organizations, suggesting that the costs 
imposed by the reforms are outweighed by benefits. One recent survey 
found that eighty-one percent of surveyed nonprofits had either their board 
chair or CEO sign Form 990 statements.90 
Charging board members on an audit committee with greater responsibil­
ity will not scare away all individuals from board service. Some have 
argued that the increased responsibility the audit-committee reforms would 
impose "may make it more difficult to recruit volunteers" for nonprofit 
boards. 91 In the for-profit world, the added responsibility imposed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley led to large increases in director pay.92 In the nonprofit world, 
87. There is an intuitive argument that for-profit organizations "can more readily absorb 
additional costs because they can pass on compliance costs to customers or raise capital in other 
ways" not available to nonprofits. Id. at 849. Yet costs do not just disappear for a for-profit entity. A 
business that cannot justify the costs of its existence to investors or consumers will shut down as 
readily as a nonprofit that cannot similarly convince donors and foundations. 
88. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 586. An officer of a nonprofit already has to sign 
Form 990 under perjury. The reforms differ in that they place the burden on senior management­
the CEO, CFO, or chair of the board of directors. 
89. See id. 
90. Lester M. Salamon & Stephanie L. Geller, Nonprofit Govemance and Accountability, 
COMMUNIQUE (Ctr. for Civil Soc'y Studies at the John Hopkins Univ. Inst. for Policy Studies, 
Baltimore, Md.), Oct. 2005, at I, 5 (2005), available at http://www.allianceonline.org/publications/ 
listening__post_communique_2.file. 
91. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 596. 
92. One survey finds between a fifty-eight percent and seventy-one percent increase in director 
pay over the period between 2001 and 2005. THOMAS E. HARTMAN, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN 
THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 10 (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_ 
s31Publications/FileUpload137 /3420/ndi%202006%20public%20study%20FINAL.pdf. 
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by contrast, directors are typically unpaid volunteers recruited more for their 
fundraising potential than financial prowess.93 Without being compensated for 
their work, they may be especially sensitive to new burdens placed on their 
time, particularly tedious audit-oversight duties.94 However, the fact that these 
directors contribute time with minimal or no expectation of payment may 
suggest an especially strong commitment to the organization's mission and a 
lack of sensitivity to additional burdens on their time. Moreover, the accom­
panying prestige and other rewards of serving as a director for a well­
respected nonprofit offset worries about an additional time commitment. Thus 
nonprofit directors will not decline to serve merely because they may be re­
quired to serve on an audit committee with increased responsibility. 95 
Finally, the auditing requirements are tailored to the ability of the non­
profit to afford such audits. 96 One commentator estimates that it will cost 
"close to $10,000" to comply with the auditing requirements, or approxi­
mately 4% of a smaller organization's annual revenue. 97 However, the 
auditing requirements only apply to relatively large nonprofits.98 Nonprofits 
choosing to voluntarily undergo an audit spend no more than 1 % of overall 
revenue on the audit, and most spend far less. Nonprofits with annual reve­
nue between $2 million to $3.8 million spend an average of 0.37% of 
revenue on audits, while nonprofits with revenue between $4 million and $9 
million spend only 0.26%.99 And perhaps the strongest evidence of the rela­
tive cost of the audit requirements is that 97% of nonprofits audit their 
financial reports, "even though only 40 percent of the organizations reported 
being aware of a state requirement to be audited."100 
Ill. THE REFORMS CREATE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS 

FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 

The reforms will benefit the nonprofit sector by increasing financial ac­
countability and improving donor confidence. tot Section III.A argues that the 
93. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1987-88. 
94. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 596. 
95. One commentator actually advocates granting standing to a greater number of people to 
increase the number of lawsuits against nonprofit directors. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 853. This ap­
proach would undoubtedly exacerbate the worry that directors would decline positions because 
exposing them to additional liability will certainly cause more fear than the simple imposition of addi­
tional duties. 
96. Szymanski. supra note 8, at 1318; Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 594. 
97. Szymanski, supra note 8, at 1318. 
98. See supra Section LB. 
99. PANEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 36, n.3 (citing a United Way survey). 
100. Salamon & Geller, supra note 90, at 5. 
I 0 I. Some critics argue that the reforms are inappropriate because they focus too narrowly on 
financial accountability instead of mission accountability. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1991; Reiser, 
Enron.org, supra note 8, at 212-15. However, the focus on financial accountability over mission ac­
countability is appropriate. After all, the reforms are trying to alleviate a perceived financial crisis in the 
sector. See supra Section I.A. Further, it is easier to create legislative enactments targeting financial 
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reforms will benefit the nonprofit sector by improving nonprofit financial 
practices, either through donor enforcement of best practices or by reminding 
nonprofit actors of their duties to run financially sound organizations. Alterna­
tively, Section 111.B argues that even if the reforms do not actually improve 
financial practices at any particular firm, they will nevertheless allay the con­
cerns of nonprofit donors, thereby increasing revenue. Finally, Section III.C 
suggests that voluntary compliance by some nonprofits is insufficient to solve 
the problems of the nonprofit sector and that legislation is the most effective 
means to accomplish these ends. 
A. The Reforms Will Enhance Financial Management 
The reforms will improve financial management of nonprofit organiza­
tions in several ways. Section III.A. I argues that the reforms will improve 
financial management by arming donors with better information. 102 Section 
IIl.A.2 argues that donors will use this enhanced information to monitor non­
profits and demand better financial practices. Even if donors do not actually 
use the information, Section IIl.A.3 argues that the reforms will improve fi­
nancial management because nonprofit actors will either miscalculate the risk 
of donor enforcement or voluntarily improve their behavior. 
1. The Reforms are Tailored to Improve Data Disclosure 
Assuming that nonprofits comply with them, 103 the reforms will likely lead 
to the release of more accurate financial data. 104 The reforms provide a series 
of safeguards designed to improve financial data, even catching willfully 
bad acts. The CEO-certification requirement encourages officers to ensure that 
financial data are accurately reported and ensures that sufficient internal­
control processes are in place to catch financial mismanagement at lower lev­
els of the organization. 105 Requiring the CEO's signature on financial 
accountability than other forms of accountability. Cf Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 227-28 (noting 
that attorneys generally avoid enforcing mission accountability because mission creep is subtler and 
less concrete and therefore more difficult to detect and prevent). Finally, financial abuse is easier to hide 
than straying from one's mission. While financial data can be evaluated by objective standards, mis­
sions are subjective, with one nonprofit's mission appealing to one person but not another. As a result, 
nonprofits lack the same incentive to misstate their mission as to misstate their finances. 
102. This requires both that nonprofits comply with the reforms' requirements and that the re­
quirements are tailored to make disclosure more accurate rather than a pointless obstacle. A reform that 
requires annual reports to be printed on pink sheets, for example, may be complied with and yet will 
utterly fail to improve the data disclosed. 
103. It will be relatively easy for state attorneys general to determine whether a nonprofit is in 
compliance with these reform and to force compliance if not. Ascertaining whether a nonprofit com­
plied with the auditing requirement is as simple as checking for an auditor's report. See Reiser, There 
Ought, supra note 8, at 594. 
I 04. Some have criticized the officer-certification requirements as providing no protection 
against willfully misbehaving actors. Id. at 584, 590. Similarly, if the auditor is complicit with 
management, abuses may not come to light. Id. at 594. Finally, a innocent yet financially inexpert 
CEO or audit committee may comply with the additional duties but still fail to catch mistakes. Id. at 
596. 
105. See supra Section J.B. I. 
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documents may increase enforcement by aiding prosecution against a ma­
levolent CE0. 106 Having a separate audit committee clarifies the financial­
oversight responsibility of the committee's members. Finally, absent com­
plicity, the outside auditor "should unearth at least some inaccuracies and 
abuses that otherwise would go unnoticed."107 
2. Donors Will Use the Improved Data to 
Force Improved Financial Management 
Despite critics' assertions to the contrary, 108 donors are likely to use the 
enhanced data to force improved financial management. Sarbanes-Oxley is 
premised on the view that the market for corporate shares is a sufficient 
regulator of corporate governance if investors have sufficient financial in­
formation. In contrast to the suggestion of critics,10') the available evidence 
suggests that donors do use financial data, and nonprofit organizations are 
complying with this practice to increase fundraising capacity. 110 Although 
industry analysts are absent from the nonprofit world, organizations do col­
lect and share nonprofit financial data. The existence of these organizations 
suggests demand for their services. GuideStar, for example, is a nonprofit 
that runs a database that contains financial information on more than 
I06. .See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in 
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. R.Ev. 937, 953 (2003) ("[T]he executive certification re­
quirement [of Sarbanes-Oxley] will make it easier to establish fraudulent conduct if its effect is to 
eliminate the defenses of lack of knowledge or good faith."). 
107. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 594. 
108. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1997-98; Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 603--05. 
109. Critics question whether either donors or state attorneys general will use this data. This 
Section concedes that reliance on state attorneys general for enforcement of better financial prac­
tices would be misplaced. State attorneys general are burdened by a "legendary" lack of manpower 
and a limited budget. Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 598. For example, ten attorneys in 
California's Office of the Attorney General are charged with overseeing 90,000 nonprofits across the 
state. Erika Torres, Nonprofit audit act brings high-profile clash to O.C., ORANGE COUNTY REG. 
(Santa Ana, Cal.), June 11, 2005. Even with proper funding, there remains the danger of "agency 
capture" by relatively powerful nonprofits. Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1997. 
Two studies cited by critics of the reforms provide only extremely weak support for the proposi­
tion that donors do not want better information. One study surveyed twenty-two individuals who 
collectively donate $50 million per year to charities and found that only four were "strongly interested" 
in getting better data on performance (not financial information) from nonprofits. Katie Cunningham & 
Marc Ricks, Why Measure?, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2004, at 44, 46. Although limited 
by its small sample size, the survey found that participants might reject an ill-fated attempt at quantify­
ing mission success (for example, one metric defined success by an increa~e in the number of 
volunteers) but still desire more objective financial information. See id. at 46, 49. Another study cited 
by critics, DAVID M. VAN SLYKE & ARTHUR c. BROOKS, CMTY. FOUND. FOR GREATER ATLANTA, THE 
POWER OF ONE: 2001 REPORT ON PERSONAL CHARITABLE GIVING IN GREATER ATLANTA (2001), 
available at http://www.atlcf.org/Webdata/Documents/35/GivingStudyFinal.pdf, was not intended to 
investigate this issue, and the little relevant evidence found in the study is contrary to the critics' claim. 
For example, the study found that sixty-two percent of those who received information on how a dona­
tion is used were likely to donate. Id. at 18. The study actually recommends that nonprofits take more 
steps to share enhanced financial information with potential donors, for example, by creating a web­
based nonprofit registry. Id. at 22. 
110. One critic of nonprofit reforms notes the effectiveness of informal donor regulation, even 
suggesting it as an alternative to other forms of regulation. Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 842, 853-54. 
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1.7 million nonprofit organizations and is visited eight-million times annu­
ally.111 Similarly, the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance certifies 112
nonprofits that meet its governance standards. In fact, 90,000 nonprofits 
have voluntarily uploaded additional financial information to these data­113bases to reach out to prospective donors. Ensuring the integrity of this data 
is vital for the thousands of donors who rely on it when making decisions. 
3. Nonprofit Financial Management Would Improve Even 
ifDonors Do Not Use Enhanced Disclosures 
Even if donors and state actors do not rely on enhanced disclosure, the 
reforms may still be beneficial. First, even if there is no real risk that the 
financial data will lead to donor or government sanction, nonprofit actors 114
may mistakenly perceive such a risk and alter their behavior accordingly. 
Thus even a willfully malicious actor may improve her behavior if she over­115
estimates the likelihood of enforcement.
Absent an actual risk, the reforms have an underappreciated communica­
tive aspect that signals the importance of financial-data integrity. The laws 
may be effective by causing nonprofit actors to internalize the concerns under­116lying the reforms. Diligent managers, cued by the reforms to treat117bookkeeping with heightened care, will avoid inadvertent rnismanagement. 
The publicity generated by these laws, with the resulting dialogue on the 
importance of solid finances, should inspire better financial oversight by 
nonprofit managers. 
B. The Refonns Will Alleviate the Concerns ofDonors 
Regardless of the extent to which these reforms enhance financial prac­
tices at a given nonprofit, the reforms will alleviate donors' concerns and 
111. GuideStar.org, About GuideStar and Philanthropic Research, Inc., http:// 
www.guidestar.org/about/index.jsp?source=dnabout (last visited Nov. I 0, 2007). Note that this is 
despite the often incomplete and inaccurate data sought to be cured by the reforms. 
112. Give.org, National Charity Seal Program, http://www.give.org/seal/abouttheseal.asp (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
113. Todd Cohen, Financial Disclosure Takes Root, Although Some Still Balk, NONPROFIT 
TIMES, July I, 2005, at I, available at http://www.nptimes.com/Jul05/npt3.html. 
114. Risks are often inaccurately estimated, and perceived risks drive behavior more than 
actual risks. See, e.g., Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National 
Survey, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 73, 80 (discussing the litigation risks involved with hospi­
tals' voluntary disclosure of unexpected treatment outcomes). 
115. See Reiser, There Ought, supra note 8, at 585 ("In the absence of clear and effective 
penalties for noncompliance, a nonprofit officer envisioned as a Holmesian "bad man"-who fol­
lows only law that predictably will be enforced against him-likewise would not change his 
behavior ...."). 
116. This argument is bolstered by a common-sense notion that people who devote their time 
and energy to nonprofit organizations are "good guys." 
117. See Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 8, at 276--77 (proposing programs to train managers of 
. nonprofits on the importance of accountability). 
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therefore increase willingness to donate to nonprofits. 118 A mistake often 
made by the commentators is to conclude that donors will make donations 
regardless of a nonprofit's financial integrity because they lack the incentive 
to investigate the financial health of an organization prior to donating. 119 To 
the contrary, as a result of the information costs associated with determining 
an individual nonprofit's financial integrity, some donors may stop donating 
to even well-managed nonprofits because malfunctioning nonprofit organi­
zations are most prominent in their minds. 120 Just as defenders of corporate 
reforms contend that Sarbanes-Oxley buoyed the investor confidence shaken 
by Enron and other contemporary scandals, 121 so too the nonprofit reforms 
may improve donor confidence by improving access to financial data. 
News stories surrounding the consideration and adoption of reforms will 
combat the negative press that created the public distrust of charities. 122 Fur­
ther, nonprofits can utilize the reforms in fundraising material, noting the 
systems in place to ensure sound financial management. 123 Most importantly, 
the reforms-particularly those mandated by legislation-provide a way for 
"good" nonprofits to limit the damage caused by the "bad." By binding 
themselves and nonprofits resistant to disclosure to sound practices, they 
may avoid future scandals. 124 News stories about a small number of actors 
can taint the entire sector, and nonprofits concerned about donor distrust 
need to demonstrate not only that they are trustworthy but that other non­
118. One critic downplays the benefits that nonprofit reforms bestow. Gilkeson, supra note 8, 
at 852. Essentially she argues that donors part with their money voluntarily and so have less interest 
in how the money is spent than an investor in a business. Id. Further, "[b ]eneficiaries may be de­
prived of a benefit, but it is not a benefit to which they are legally entitled." Id. Even assuming that 
such a cramped definition of interest is appropriate, it overlooks the benefits raised in this Part. 
119. See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1998-99. 
120. For example, consider how public perception of the entire sector depended so much on 
the image of a handful of high-profile nonprofits. See infra Part I. 
121. See John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the Interna­
tional Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 246-48 (2003); David Henry, Not 
Everyone Hates SarbOx, BVSINESSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 37 ("SarbOx and related reforms have 
produced much more reliable corporate financial statements, which investors rely on when deciding 
whether to buy or sell shares. For them, SarbOx has been a godsend."). 
122. A search on LexisNexis "News, All" database for references to the California Nonprofit 
Integrity Act showed forty-five hits that mention the act. Among these hits are an article in the New 
York Times, which has a circulation over one million, and an article in the NonProfit Times, 
which claims a readership of over 85,000 nonprofit executives. NonProfit Times, http:// 
www.nptimes.com/main/subscribe.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (providing NonProfit Times 
circulation data); New York Times Company: Revenue & Circulation Data, http://www.nytco.com/ 
investors/financials/nyt-circulation.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (providing New York Times 
circulation data); see also Mark Hrywna, Special Report: The Sky Isn't Falling: Fear of SOX is 
Waning, NONPROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 19; Bernard Stamler, After a Spate of Scandals, A De­
bate on New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at F25. The press accounts tend to assume the 
benefit of the reforms yet bemoan the cost. 
123. For example, United Way and Red Cross have posted statements on accountability on 
their web pages. Red Cross, Governance, http://www.redcross.org/services/governance/ 
0,1082,0_234_,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); United Way, Accountability, http:// 
national.unitedway.org/about/accountability.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
124. See infra Section IIl.C. 
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I~ ,profits are as well. That some of the reforms are addressed only to larger 
nonprofits suggests the importance of boosting confidence in the most visi­
ble charities to maintain confidence across the entire sector. 126 
C. Legislation ls the Most Effective Way 
to Accomplish These Goals 
The best way to accomplish the cost-effective reforms laid out above is 
through mandatory regulation. 127 If widely adopted, voluntary reforms will 
prevent financial mismanagement but will not be fully effective in 
preventing fraud or restoring donor confidence. 128 If left as a best-practices 
suggestion, the reforms may only be adopted by those nonprofits that are 
already concerned about financial integrity. Those nonprofits that most need 
tighter financial management are unlikely to adopt the voluntary proposals 
because financial management is not a priority for them. Even "good" 
nonprofits may suffer from an agency problem where the best-intentioned 
nonprofit managers will be especially sensitive to the burdens of reforms 
that accrue to them personally but less sensitive to the benefits that flow to 
the organization as a whole. 129 When a scandal develops at one of these 
125. Cf Gilkeson, supra note 8, at 842 (noting that the media "focus[es] only on the largest 
and most well-known charities and the worst offenders"). For example, the public's perception of 
the nonprofit sector at large is tied closely to its perception of just a few, large charities. See supra 
note 29 and accompanying text. 
126. Thus it is really the smaller nonprofits that have yet to establish a reliable name for 
themselves that· will benefit from increased confidence in the sector, without having to endure the 
same costs as larger nonprofits. 
127. Further, state-level regulation (as opposed to federal regulation) is more appropriate here 
than it is in corporate reform. First, like for-profit entities, nonprofits are inherently creatures of state 
law and have historically been regulated at the state level. Unlike for-profits entities, however, non­
profits are less associated with commerce. (In fact, extensive federal regulation of nonprofits could 
raise constitutional issues about exceeding federal authority under the commerce clause if such 
regulation was not tied to the taxing power.) Moreover, unlike centrally managed corporations, 
nonprofits tend to have a decentralized structure, with local affiliates in states possessing some 
degree of autonomy from the national organization. Finally, although the scandals affecting the 
corporate world were national in scope, many of the nonprofit scandals affected local nonprofit 
affiliates and were covered primarily by the local press. In states where scandals have not been a big 
concern, the legislature could enact reforms tailored to the fears of the local population. 
128. See supra Section 11.B. 
129. This is analogous to Supreme Court cases that establish qualified immunity for certain 
public officials for civil-rights violations but decline to extend immunity to municipal entities. The 
Court reasoned that personal liability would distort decision making because although it amplifies 
the cost of certain actions, the benefits of compliance are not directly experienced by the official. 
Compare Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (denying personal liability because of the 
"danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the 
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good"), with Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 653 n.37 (1980) ("[I]mposing personal liability on public officials could have an 
undue chilling effect on the exercise of their decision-making responsibilities, but that no such per­
nicious consequences were likely to flow from the possibility of a recovery from public funds."). 
But see Owen, 445 U.S. at 668-69 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "responsible" public officers 
will be deterred the same regardless of whether the judgment comes from personal or municipal 
funds). 
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nonprofits, the resulting media attention damages the entire sector. 130 
Mandatory legislation provides a way to prevent these nonprofits from 
tainting the entire sector. 131 
Further, legislatively imposed reforms are a more effective way of as­
suaging the public's fears. It appears that the media is willing to focus its 
attention on the bad acts of a single nonprofit, yet it apparently takes a ges­
ture as dramatic and widespread as the California Nonprofit Integrity Act to 
paint the sector in a positive light. The public may take better notice of leg­
islation that changes the rules for a whole class of nonprofits than merely a 
single nonprofit that changes policy. 132 Legislation can be a tool for the non­
profit sector to mitigate the damage caused by the "bad apples" while 
generating increased confidence among potential donors. 
CONCLUSION 
Nonprofits serve a role far different from their corporate counterparts, 
yet both the nonprofit and corporate sectors suffer from similar effects of 
financial mismanagement. Preserving the vibrancy of nonprofits through 
targeted reforms is vital to the millions of Americans who benefit from this 
sector every day. 
State legislatures should enact regulations to improve confidence in the 
nonprofit sector because such trust is crucial for the sector's vitality and its 
ability to obtain donations. The reforms modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley im­
prove the accuracy of financial disclosure and appease the concerns of 
donors without imposing insurmountable burdens on the sector. The reforms 
provide a net benefit to the sector, increasing donations and ensuring that the 
donations received are not inappropriately diverted to the unlawful benefit 
of a few corrupt insiders. 
130. See supra Section 11.B.iii. 
131. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra Section 11.B.iii. 
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